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ABSTRACT 
One of the most highly touted virtues of knowledge-based expert systems i their 
ability to construct explanations for their lines of reasoning. However, there is a 
basic difficulty in generating explanations in expert systems that reason under 
uncertainty using numeric measures. In particular, systems based on evidential 
reasoning using the theory of belief functions have lacked all but the most 
rudimentary facilities for explaining their conclusions. In this paper we review the 
process whereby other expert system technologies produce xplanations, and present 
a methodology for augmenting an evidential reasoning system with a versatile 
explanation facility. The method, which is based on sensitivity analysis, has been 
implemented, and several examples of its use are described. 
KEYWORDS:  evidential reasoning, reasoning under uncertainty, belief 
functions, Dempster-Shafer theory, sensitivity analysis, explanation 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most highly touted virtues of knowledge-based xpert systems is 
their ability to construct explanations of deduced lines of reasoning. Endowing 
such systems with an explanation facility has two major advantages (Barr and 
Feigenbaum [1]). First, an explanation facility contributes to the transparency 
of the program. That is, it allows the user to observe, and perhaps question, the 
individual inferences that contribute to the conclusions that are reached. This 
ability to examine a system's inner workings fosters a sense of confidence in the 
mind of the user; he can become satisfied that the system really "knows" what it 
is doing and has not just happened upon a plausible conclusion. An explanation 
capability is thus an important component of user acceptance of a knowledge- 
based system. Second, explanations can be a useful tool for the knowledge 
Address correspondence to Thomas M. Strat, A I  Center, SRI International, 333 Ravenswood 
A venue, Menlo Park, California 94025. 
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 1989; 3:299-353 
© 1989 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 
655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010 0898-613X/89/$3.50 299 
300 Thomas M. Strat and John D. Lowrance 
engineer. Information gained by questioning the system about its own 
knowledge base can be valuable for debugging and refining the stored 
knowledge. Randall Davis's TEIRESIAS is a good example of a system that 
exploits explanations for the purpose of knowledge ngineering (Davis and 
Lenat [2]). 
The goal of developing knowledge-based systems that can reason with 
information that is uncertain or inexact in one way or another has long been a 
part of artificial intelligence research. Several technologies have been proposed 
for representing knowledge and deriving consequences from imperfect data: 
MYCIN's certainty factors (Shortliffe [3]), Prospector's inference nets (Reboh 
[4]), fuzzy sets (Zadeh [5]), Bayesian ets (Pearl [6]), and Dempster-Shafer 
belief unctions (Lowrance and Garvey [7]) are prominent examples. Individual 
differences aside, all of these technologies have one thing in common: a basic 
difficulty in constructing explanations of lines of reasoning. 
In this paper we review the process whereby expert systems currently 
generate xplanations, and identify the reasons why explanation generation is
difficult in uncertain-reasoning systems. We then propose an explanation facility 
for one class of automated reasoning systems that does incorporate uncertainty: 
evidential reasoning. Implementation of this facility results in a knowledge- 
based system that has both a well-founded representation f uncertainty and a 
nontrivial ability to explain its inference paths. 
In Section 2 we review the state of the art of explanation generation for both 
Boolean-valued and uncgrtainty-based expert systems. Section 3 contains an 
overview of evidentiai reasoning developed at SRI International that is based on 
the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. Section 4 presents our design 
for endowing evidential reasoning with an explanation facility based on 
sensitivity analysis techniques. We conclude with a discussion of the utility of 
the approach and the feasibility of providing such a facility in uncertain- 
reasoning systems based on other technologies. The appendix contains a 
comprehensive example of the techniques described herein, as implemented in 
the evidential reasoning system known as Gister I (Lowrance t al. [8]). 
2. EXPLANATION GENERATION 
The generation of useful explanations in knowledge-based systems has three 
main requirements: 
1. An effective xplanation must be based on a recapitulation of actions 
taken by a program. 
2. The correct level of detail of those actions must be chosen. 
J Gister is a trademark of SRI International. 
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3. There must be a shared vocabulary that makes the program's actions 
comprehensible to the user. 
In simple production systems, these requirements are commonly found to be 
satisfied without much difficulty. But consider a program that performs 
inference using a numerical measure of belief (e.g., Spiegelhalter and Knill- 
Jones [9]). It is difficult to imagine what explanation the system could give if it 
were queried about a computed probability. A simple recapitulation of all 
invocations of a combination rule is unlikely to yield an explanation that 
resembles a user's conscious thought. Although such a sequence may be an 
effective computational model, there is no easy way to interpret i in a form that 
can be intuitively understood. This is not a criticism of using belief measures 
within expert systems; rather it is indicative of the difficulty of generating 
explanations within any system that employs a numeric measure of belief. A 
better appreciation of this difficulty can be gained by studying the explanation 
facilities of several systems based on various technologies. 
Logic Programming 
In a logic program, acollection of facts represents known truths about objects, 
and rules define relationships among objects. A computation is a deduction of 
logical consequences from a logic program. Rules are statements of the form 
IF Ai and A2 and ... and An THEN B. (2.1) 
The law of modus ponens ays that from (2.1) and facts A l, A2 . . . . .  An one can 
deduce B. An existentially qualified goal G is deducible from a program if there 
is a rule with an instance of the form 
IF xl and x2 and ... and xn THEN y 
such that y is an instance of G, and the xi's are deducible recursively from the 
program. Unification is used to find a rule whose consequent is an instance of the 
goal. 
For any given goal G that is deducible from the program, one can construct a 
proof tree whose root is G, whose leaves are all instances of facts, and whose 
structure represents he invocations of rules in a given deduction of G. A proof 
tree is thus a data structure that can be used to answer queries about a 
computation. While the proof tree as described is only a conceptual notion, one 
can construct a proof tree automatically b  making use of a meta-interpreter. For 
example, a partial meta-interpreter for constructing proof trees in Prolog 
(Sterling and Shapiro [10]) is given in Figure la. 
Once the proof tree has been constructed, an explanation of a given 
computation can be generated in a straightforward fashion. Suitable justifica- 
tions for conclusions derived by modus ponens can be produced by reciting the 
fact (or collection of facts) that triggered the rule. When additional detail is 
302 Thomas M. Strat and John D. Lowrance 
solve(Goal, Tree) - -  Tree is a proof tree for Goal 
clause(A, B) - -  A<-B is a clause in the program 
clause(A, true) - -  A is a fact 
so lve( t rue ,  t rue) .  
solve((A, B), (ProofA, ProofB)) <- solve(A, ProofA), 
solve(B, ProofB). 
solve(A, (A <- Proof))  <- clause(A, B), 
solve(B, Proof) .  
(a) Constructing a proof tree. 
how(Goal) - -  Explains how the goal was proved 
how(Goal) <- solve(Goal, Proof), interpret(Proof). 
i n te rpret ( (P roo f l ,  Proof2)) <- i n te rpret (P roo f l ) ,  
in terpret (P roo f2) .  
in terpret (P roo f )  <- fact (Proof ,  Fact) ,  
wr i te ln( [Fact ,  ' i s  a fact  in the data base . ' ]  
in terpret (P roo f )  <- ru le(Proof ,  Head, Body, Proof1),  
writeln([Head, ' is proved using the ru le ' ] ) ,  
wr i te ln ( ' I F ' ) ,  write(Body), writeln([ 'THEN',  Head]) 
in terpret (P roo f l ) .  
fac t ( (Fact<- t rue) ,Fact ) .  
ru le((Goal<-Proof) ,Goal ,Body,Proof)  <- not_equal(Proof,  t rue) ,  
extract_body(Proof,  Body). 
extract_body((Goal<-Proof) ,  Goal). 
(b) Generating explanations. 
Figure 1. A Partial Meta-Interpreter for Prolog. (a) Constructing a proof tree. (b) 
Generating explanations. 
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place_in_oven(Dish, Rack) - -  Dish should be placed in the oven at 
level R~ck for baking 
place_in_oven(Dish,top) <- pastry(Dish), size(Dish,small). 
place_in_oven(Dish,middle) <- pastry(Dish), size(Dish,big). 
place_in_oven(Dish,middle) <- main_meal(Dish). 
place_in_oven(Dish,low) <- slow cooker(Dish). 
pastry(Dish) <- type(Dish,cake). 
pastry(Dish) <- type(Dish,bread). 
main_meal(Dish) <- type(Dish,meat). 





(a) A Prolog program for placing dishes in an oven 
how(place_in_oven(dishl, top))? 
place_in_oven(dishl, top) is proved using the rule 
IF pastry(dishl) and size(dishl, small) 
THEN place_in_oven(dishl, top) 
pastry(dish1) is proved using the rule 
IF type(dishl, bread) 
THEN pastry(dish1) 
type(dish1, bread) is a fact in the data base. 
size(dishl, small) is a fact in the data base. 
(b) A sample explanation 
Figure 2. Explanation Generation within Prolog. (a) A Prolog program for placing 
dishes in an oven. Co) A sample explanation. 
required, reiterating the rule may also be of use. Figure lb provides aportion of 
a Prolog meta-interpreter hat generates a complete xplanation by traversing the 
proof tree. An example of what such an explanation might look like is illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
This is the basic mechanism whereby explanations are produced in systems 
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based on logic programming, although its implementation may vary greatly from 
one system to another. 
Mechanisms to control the depth to which the proof tree is explored can be 
used to better satisfy the second requirement for useful explanations--choosing 
the correct level of detail. Additionally, a more appropriate vocabulary can be 
used by augmenting each rule with a descriptive natural language phrase that is 
displayed in place of the rule itself--thus addressing the third requirement. 
Certainty Factors 
The need to represent uncertain or inexact information in some applications 
has forced system developers toimplement new formalisms. For example, in the 
MYCIN system for diagnosis of infectious diseases (Shortliffe [3]), the standard 
production system representation was augmented with certainty factors to 
account for the judgmental quality of some rules. On a scale of 1.0 to - 1.0, a 
certainty factor (CF) measures the degree to which a rule's consequent does or 
does not follow from its premise. 
Introducing CFs into a rule-based system can greatly expand the search 
required to reach a conclusion. In a Boolean-valued logic, any path from the goal 
to known facts is adequate to assert he truth of the goal, but a rule-based system 
incorporating uncertainty must invoke all rules that unify with every subgoal in 
the search tree. While many systems have been written that successfully cope 
with the additional computation this paradigm requires, it presents ubstantial 
obstacles to the construction of suitable xplanations. 
Consider what is required to generate an explanation at any level in the proof 
tree. In a Boolean-valued system, a single rule reduces each subgoal. In 
MYCIN, several rules may contribute to the CF of a subgoal, and all of those 
rules must be displayed to construct a complete xplanation from a MYCIN 
inference. 
Another difficulty is illustrated by the following MYCIN excerpt (Davis and 
Lenat [2]): 
The following rules were used in deducing that the identity of 
ORGANISM-1 is pseudomonas-aeruginosa 
RULE 184 
Since [1.1] the category of ORGANISM-1 is not known 
[1.2] the gram stain of ORGANISM-1 is gramneg 
[1.3] the morphology of ORGANISM-1 is rod 
[1.4] the aerobicity of ORGANISM-1 is facultative 
There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.3) that the identity 
of ORGANISM-1 is pseudomonas-aeruginosa 
The low CF associated with the rule calls into question whether the rule is 
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really a reasonable explanation. What if the CF were even lower? What it it were 
negative, implying that the premises are a contraindication f the consequent? 
The conclusion is that systems that use CFs must find a way to select he most 
important rules used in an inference if they are to satisfy the second requirement 
of explanation generation. TEIRESIAS incorporated mechanisms tocontrol the 
level of detail of explanations generated for MYCIN based on a measure of 
information content but did not attempt o distinguish among the relative 
contributions when more than one rule was applicable to a given subgoal (Davis 
and Lenat [2]). 
Inference Nets 
Tracing the arcs of an inference network is the analog of rule backtracing in a 
rule-based system. As with systems employing certainty factors, several 
evidence nodes may contribute to the belief in a hypothesis node, so an 
appropriate explanation may consist of several supporting reasons. An example 
of an explanation using an inference net from Prospector (Reboh [4]) (Figure 3) 
follows. 
My certainty in 
1. XYZ-type deposit 
is now 1.21547 
Do you wish to see additional information? 
I suspect that 
1 - (* XYZ-type deposit) (1.21 547) 
YES 
There is one favorable factor: 
1: 1. Favorable intrusives in target area 4.99999 
There is one positive factor with neutral effect that, if negative, 
could have been significant: 
1: 2. You were sure that the prospect is in a volcanic province 
5.0 
There is one uncertain factor whose score may be subject to 
change: 
1: 3. Favorable zones 0 .227085 
Constructing an explanation i this case is straightforward, because the nodes in 
Prospector inference nets represent binary predicates (e.g., whether or not there 
are favorable intrusives in the target area). In Hydro, a derivative system 
designed for water resource management problems (Gaschnig et al. [11]), the 
Prospector model was extended to allow multivalued predicates, and explanation 
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Figure 3. An Inference Network from Prospector. 
generation became more difficult: 
On a scale from - 5 to 5, my certainty that 
6: 1) INTFW based on soil type and vegetation, corrected for 
slope and geology has a value between 0.72 and 1.98 (most likely 
1.2825) 
(computed by a formula) is now 4.0. 
Do you wish to see additional information? YES 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
There are two favorable factors; in order of importance: 
6.1: 1) INTFW based on soil type and vegetation, corrected for 
slope has 
a value between 0.72 and 0.99 (most likely 0.855) (certainty 4.0) 
6.1 : 2) Correction factor for geology has a value between 1.0 and 
2.0 
(most likely 1.5) (certainty 3.0) 
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This explanation was constructed by walking the inference net and computing 
the range of possible values given the evidence collected to that point. While the 
numeric values in the Prospector explanation made interpretation a chore, in 
Hydro the explanation can be understood only by someone very familiar with 
both the hydrological domain and Hydro's representation f uncertainty. The 
explanation is barely comprehensible, contradicting the third requirement. 
Prospector and Hydro both possess additional features to produce a more 
sophisticated interpretation f the state of their knowledge bases, such as the 
ability to perform a best and worst case analysis of the possible effect of a 
missing piece of evidence. In a later version, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed by applying Prospector in batch mode to a test case while 
systematically modifying the input data [12]). This analysis was used primarily 
to identify areas of disagreement between the expert and the system. 
Belief Functions 
The theory of belief functions, as originally conceived by Dempster [13] and 
further developed by Shafer [14], has received considerable attention as a basis 
for representing uncertainty within expert systems. The theory is a generaliza- 
tion of classical probability theory and provides a representation f degrees of 
precision as well as degrees of uncertainty. Its ability to express partial 
ignorance is of great value in the design of knowledge-based systems for real- 
word domains. 
Currently, one of the most highly developed knowledge-based systems that 
incorporates Shafer's theory of belief functions for a wide range of application 
domains is Gister (Lowrance t al. [8]). While Gister performs tasks similar to 
those of expert systems based on other technologies, like all systems based on 
belief functions it has only a rudimentary explanation capability. In the next 
section, we present an overview of the evidential reasoning technology 
employed by Gister. The derivation of a method for generating explanations 
within evidential reasoning systems follows that. 
3. OVERVIEW OF EVIDENTIAL REASONING 
We now give a brief review of evidential reasoning. The reader is referred to 
Lowrance t al. [8] for a fuller treatment of this technology. 
Fundamentals 
The goal of evidential reasoning is to assess the effect of all available pieces of 
evidence upon a hypothesis, by making use of domain-specific knowledge. The 
first step in applying evidential reasoning to a given problem is to delimit a 
propositional space of possible situations. Within the theory of belief unctions, 
this propositional space is called the frame of discernment. A frame of 
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discernment delimits a set of possible situations, exactly one of which is true at 
any one time. Once a frame of discernment has been established, propositional 
statements can be represented by subsets of elements from the frame 
corresponding to those situations for which the statements are true. Bodies of 
evidence are expressed as probabilistic opinions about he partial truth or falsity 
of propositional statements relative to a frame. Belief assigned to a nonatomic 
subset explicitly represents a lack of information sufficient to enable more 
precise distribution. This allows belief to be attributed to statements whose 
granularity is appropriate to the available vidence. 
The distribution of a unit of belief over a frame of discernment is called a 
mass distribution. A mass distribution mo is a mapping from subsets of a frame 
of discernment O into the unit interval: 
mo : 2 ° - [0, 1] 
such that 
mo((~)=O and ~ moO()= 1 
XGO 
Any proposition that has been attributed nonzero mass is called a focal element. 
One of the ramifications of this representation f belief is that the belief in a 
hypothesis X is constrained to lie within an interval [Spt(X), Pls(X)], where 
Spt(X)= ~ me(Y) and Pls(X)= 1 - Spt(X) (3.1) 
Y=_X 
These bounds are commonly referred to as support and plausibility. A body of  
evidence (BOE) is represented by a mass distribution together with its frame of 
discernment. A BOE that directly represents one of the available pieces of 
evidence is said to be primitive; all other BOEs are conclusions or intermediate 
conclusions. 
In evidential reasoning, domain-specific knowledge is defined in terms of 
compatibility relations that relate one frame of discernment to another. A 
compatibility relation simply describes which elements from the two frames can 
simultaneously be true. A compatibility relation OA,B between two frames OA 
and OB is a set of pairs such that 
OA,B C_ OA X OB 
where every element of OA and every dement of OB is included in at least one 
pair. 
Evidential reasoning provides a number of formal operations for assessing 
evidence, including the following. 
1. Fusion--to determine a consensus from several bodies of evidence 
obtained from independent sources. Fusion is accomplished through 
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. 
Dempster's rule of combination: 
1 
m3°(Ah) = 1 -k  ~ m~(Ai)~m2(Aj) (3.2) 
AiNAj=Ah 
k= ~ m~(Ai) m2(Aj) (3.2) 
AiO Aj= (Z) 
Dempster's rule is both commutative and associative (meaning evidence 
can be fused in any order) and has the effect of focusing belief on those 
propositions that are held in common. 
Translation--to determine the impact of a body of evidence upon 
elements of a related frame of discernment. The translation of BOE from 
frame 0,4 to frame OB using the compatibility relation O,4,B is defined by 
moB(Bj) = ~ moa (Ak) (3.3) 
CA.B(Ak)=B] 
Ak C- OA,BjC- OB 
where C`4-B(Zk) = {byl(ai, by) E OA,B, ai E Ag}. 
3. Projection--to determine the impact of a body of evidence at some future 
(or past) point in time. The projection operation is defined in exactly the 
same manner as translation, where the frames are taken to be one time unit 
apart. 
4. Discounting--to adjust a body of evidence to account for the credibility of 
its source. Discounting is defined as 
m~Scoun~d(Aj)= [ otmo(Aj) Ajg:O (3.4) 
1 - et + o~mo (O) otherwise 
where c~ is the assessed credibility of the original BOE(0 < ct _< 1). 
Several other evidential operations have been defined and are described 
elsewhere (Lowrance and Garvey [8]). 
Independent opinions are expressed by multiple bodies of evidence. Depen- 
dent opinions can be represented either as a single body of evidence or as a 
network structure that shows the interrelationships of several BOEs. The 
evidential reasoning approach focuses on a body of evidence, which describes a 
meaningful collection of interrelated beliefs, as the primitive representation. I  
contrast, all other technologies described in Section 2 focus on individual 
propositions. 
The Analysis  o f  Evidence 
To make the description more concrete, we trace through the analysis of the 
following simple problem. 
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At 8:00 this morning I left for my office from my house in Palo Alto. At 9:00 I
received aphone call from a San Mateo County police officer, who informed 
me that someone in his district found my dog, Rufus, running loose. At 10:00, 
a coworker arrived and said that on his way to work, he saw a dog that looked 
like Rufus cross Highway 280. Rufus has run away twice before; once I found 
him in Los Altos and the other time in Menlo Park. Where should I look for 
Rufus? 
In evidential reasoning the first step is to construct the sets of possibilities (the 
frames of discernment) of each unknown. For example, my dog Rufus could 
possibly be in any of the following cities: 
{Atherton, LosAltos, MenloPark, MountainView, PaloAlto, Sunnyvale} 
Other frames could also be constructed; we would probably want one for 
highways, 
{Hwyl01, Hwy280, elsewhere} 
and one for counties, 
{SanMateo, SantaClara} 
The second step is to construct he compatibility relations that define the 
domain-specific relationships between the frames. Cities and counties are clearly 
related, so we might define the Cities-Counties relation graphically as shown in 
Figure 4. The relationship between cities and highways is also shown there. A 
connection between two propositions A i and BI indicate that they may co-occur 
[in other words, (AI, BI) E OA,B]. 
Time dependencies can also be expressed by compatibility relations. We can 
construct a state transition diagram describing how far Rufus can wander. For 




Figure 4. Compatibility Relations. 
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DELTA-Cities 
Figure $. Compatibility Relation Resembling a State Transition Diagram. 
Palo Alto to Los Altos, Menlo Park, or Mountain View. This information, along 
with travel times between other cities, can be expressed as the state transition 
graph in Figure 5, where the time interval for each arc is one hour. This graph 
can be interpreted as a compatibility relation, where each arc connects elements 
of the city frame to those cities where the dog could possible be one hour later. 
Once the frames and compatibility relations have been established, we can 
analyze the evidence. The goal of the analysis is to establish a line of reasoning 
from the evidence to determine belief in a hypothesis (e.g., the present location 
of Rufus). 
The first step is to assess each piece of evidence relative to an appropriate 
frame of discernment. Each piece of evidence is represented as a mass 
distribution, which distributes a unit of belief over subsets of the frame. For 
example, the fact that Rufus was at home when I left at 8:00 is pertinent to the 
Cities frame at 8:00 (Cities@8:00), and I would attribute 1.0 to PaloAito to 
indicate my complete certainty that he was there. The phone call from the 
policeman gives information about Counties@9:00, specifically that Rufus was 
in San Mateo at 9:00. Because this information is not as compelling as my 
knowledge of Rufus' whereabouts at 8:00, it is discounted to assess its true 
impact. Assuming that there is a 10% chance that the information is erroneous, 
we attribute 0.90 mass to SanMateo, and 0.10 to San Mateo, Santa Clara. The 
third piece of evidence, that my coworker saw a dog like Rufus cross Highway 
#280, gave information about Highways@lO:O0 and might be assessed as 
giving 0.65 support that it was Rufus crossing the road and 0.35 that my 
coworker couldn't see the dog well enough to identify him. The last piece of 
evidence (Rufus's previous escapes) weakly suggests that the dog may have 
returned to either Los Altos or Menlo Park. Each possibility is modeled as a 
mass distribution giving 0.25 to the city and 0.75 to "anywhere." This 
evaluation of evidence is quite subjective; however, when objective stimates 
are not possible, subjective stimates must suffice. For purposes of this paper, it 
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is sufficient o accept some numeric estimate of belief, and we won't discuss 
further how these assessments should be made. 
The final step is to construct the actual analysis of the evidence to determine 
its impact upon the question at hand. In this case the question can be answered by 
an assessment of belief over elements in the Cities frame at 10:00. The 
evidential operations can be used to derive a body of evidence providing beliefs 
about where Rufus might be at 10:00. A good starting point might be to pool the 
San Mateo police report with the fact that Rufus was home at 8:00. Before we 
can combine these two bodies of evidence, we must adjust them to a common 
frame, say Cities@9:00. 
Translating the police report to the Cities frame yields 
f 0.90 x= {Atherton, MenloPark} 
Policecities@9:°°(X)= ~0.10  X : {Ocities@9:oo} 
Projecting the BOE representing Rufus being at home at 8:00 to the Cities 
frame at 9:00 uses the DELTA-Cities relation and yields 
Homeoties@9:oo(X) = 1.0, 
x= {LosAltos, MenloPark, Mountain View, PaloAlto } 
These two independent BOEs are now represented relative to a common frame 
and can be combined using the fusion operation (i.e., Dempster's rule). Fusing 
the two previous mass distributions yields 
mcities@9:oo(X ) 
= f0 .90 
 O.lO 
x = {MenloPark }
x= { LosAltos, MenloPark, Mountain View, PaloAlto } 
The remainder of the evidence is taken into account by translating, projecting, 
and fusing according to the analysis graph shown in Figure 6. The result is a 
mass distribution relative to the Cities frame at 10:00, from which conclusions 
about Rufus's whereabouts can be drawn. Specifically, 






x = {LosAltos }
x = {LosAltos, MenloPark, PaloAlto } 
x = {MenloPark }
x = {LosAltos, Sunnyvale } 
x= {Atherton, LosAltos, MenloPark, 
Mountainview, PaloAlto, Sunnyvale} 
The associated evidential intervals for the atomic propositions in this mass 
distribution are the following: 
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Home Pol ice Coworker Los Altos Menlo Park  
Figure 6. The Completed Analysis Graph. 
[Spt( { LosA ltos }), PIs( { LosA ltos })1 
[Spt({MenloPark }), Pls({MenloPark })] 
[Spt({Atherton }), Pls({Atherton })] 
[Spt({PaloAlto }), Pls({PaloAlto })] 
[Spt({Sunnyvale}), Pls({Sunnyvale})] 
= [0.63, 0.92] 
= [0.08, 0.32] 
= [0.00, 0.24] 
= [0.00, 0.24] 
= [0.00, 0.07] 
[Spt({Mountainview}), Pls({Mountainview})] = [0.00, 0.02] 
The hypothesis {LosAltos} is clearly the most likely of all individual cities. 
All the operations discussed above have been implemented within Gister. 
Frames and compatibility relations are represented as graphs, which can be 
constructed, examined, and modified interactively. It is necessary to have an 
automated means to compute a conclusion, however, without some deeper 
explanation of why the conclusion is to be believed, it may be difficult o accept. 
The completed analysis graph (Figure 6) can be seen to be the counterpart of
the proof tree of logical deduction. Each node represents an opinion, and the 
arcs trace the derivation of one opinion from other opinions and the knowledge 
contained in the compatibility relations. The complete graph shows the 
derivation of an ultimate conclusion from the primitive bodies of evidence. The 
next section presents a methodology that makes use of the analysis graph to 
explain evidential conclusions. 
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4. GENERATING EXPLANATIONS WITHIN EVIDENTIAL 
REASONING 
We have already seen how the analysis graph can be constructed as the 
evidential analog of a proof tree. In this section we will use it as a data structure 
that defines the information flow from primitive sources of evidence to 
conclusions. The interpretation f an analysis graph as a data-flow model gives 
intuitive appeal to the discussion that follows. 
As was done with Hydro, we will use sensitivity analysis as the basis for 
constructing explanations. Because the belief function representation provides a
richer vocabulary for expressing uncertainties than was used in Hydro, we will 
need a more sophisticated technique to identify the most significant justifications 
of a conclusion. 
Sensitivity analysis requires a systematic variation of inputs to determine a 
family of solutions in the output space (Radonovich [15]). In Hydro, the 
probabilities of each piece of evidence are the relevant input parameters. In 
Gister, this is not feasible because the space of conceivable belief functions is 
exponentially arge. Fortunately, a smaller, more intuitive parameter space is 
available--one that is motivated by the data-flow interpretation f the analysis 
graph. In particular, the credibility of each primitive body of evidence can be 
varied and the effect upon the conclusions of interest ascertained. This is 
accomplished by means of the discounting operation. The updated belief in a 
hypothesis can be computed by reevaluating the data-flow graph after 
discounting one (or more) of the primitive bodies of evidence on which it 
depends. 
Single Hypothesis 
In this section we develop the tools to explain why a particular hypothesis was 
found to be strongly (or weakly) supported. For example, we seek an answer to 
the question, "Why do you believe Rufus is in Los Altos at 10:00?" 
The simplest case to consider is the fusion of two bodies of evidence, as 
shown below: 
IUE  
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O={A,  B . . . .  } 
0.8 x=A 
Ml(x)  = 0.2 x= ¢~ 
M2(x)= [0 .3  x = B 
0.7 x=O 
0.74 x=A 
M3(x) = ~ 0.08 x = B 
(,0.18 x=Z 
[Spt(A), Pls(A)]M3 = [0.74, 0.92] 
[Spt(B), Pls(B)]M3 = [0.08, 0.26] 
[Spt(A V B), PIs(A V B)]M3 = [0.82, 1.00] 
To perform a sensitivity analysis of this graph, we insert a discounting node 
after each BOE representing primitive vidence. For each such BOEi, we define 
oti to be the credibility of that evidence, so that 
oti= 1 = full impact of BOEi 
(3/i = 0 -------* BOEi is  ignored 
Obviously, if ¥i, o~i = 1, then the computation i the modified analysis graph is 
the same as the ordinary fusion defined by the original graph. We are now in a 
position to answer "Why do you believe [Spt(A), Pls(A)] = [0.74, 0.92]?" 
The process consists of two steps: 
1. Compute for each BOEi 
~i= 1 0 Pls(A ) cti= 1 0 Spt(A) ~si (A)  - ~pti(A) -- -- (4.1) 
0Odi 00/ i  
Here, ~'pti(A ) is interpreted as the sensitivity of the support for A to BOEi, 
and likewise for plausibility. 
2. Identify those BOEi with the extreme values. 
The quantities in the preceding equations indicate the change in the support or 
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plausibility relative to a change in the credibility of an evidence source. The 
partial derivative is evaluated at cti = 1 to assess the sensitivity of the 
conclusion, which was computed at oti = 1. 
In theory, these quantities can be computed algebrically or numerically; in 
practice, numeric techniques are typically more practical. Returning to the 
previous example, we find 
0.8 - 0.24ot2 
= =0.97 
0.192o~ 2-  0.24ctl -i = 1 
~ppt2(A)-- (l_0.24OZlOt2) 2 =-0 .08  
From this information, it is apparent that BOE1 is strong evidence in support of 
A, and BOE2 weakly detracts from its support. 




Argues against Argues for Hypersensitive for 
-1 0 ] 
It can also be informative to interpret Spti(A) and Plsi (Z) wi~ the aid of a 
sensitivity space, as illustrated in Figure 7. Plotting ~/ (A)  and'P~si (A) in this 
space for each i yields a scatter plot that can be used to further analyze the results 
of the sensitivity computation. The farther a point is from the origin of 
sensitivity space, the greater the impact he BOE that that point represents has 
upon the conclusion. Entries in the northeast quadrant identify BOEs that 
support proposition A, while BOEs in the southwest quadrant argue against A. 
Points in the northwest signify BOEs that add to the confusion about the 
hypothesis, while the southeast quadrant identifies BOEs that argue both for and 
against he hypothesis. 
So far, we have given examples only of a sensitivity analysis for a single 
fusion node. The techniques can be extended in a straightforward manner to 
apply across the full extent of an analysis graph. For example, the analysis in 
Figure 6 can be augmented with discounting nodes after each primitive vidence 
node. When the resulting analysis graph is viewed as a data-flow model, the 
discounting nodes can be seen to act as "valves," where lowering the a-value 
serves to diminish the flow of information through the valve. 
A discrete approximation to the quantities ~pti(A) and ~s/  (,4) can be 
obtained for any proposition A by systematically varying each of the ai's and 
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A 
l Pls(A) 
Disputes  arguments  both  For  Rrgues fo r  fl 
and aga ins t  f l  . and  . 
A 
Spt(A) 
Rrgu~s aga lns t  R 
and 
d isputes  argunents  fo r  R 
Rrgues both  fo r  
and aga innt  R 
Figure 7. Sensitivity Space for Support and Plausibility. 
reevaluating the data flow. This information then indicates the relevant import of 
each piece of primitive vidence. Plotting each point in sensitivity space yields a 
graphic illustration of the effect each body of evidence has upon the belief in a 
proposition. 
Returning to the Rufus example, sensitivity analysis hows 
~ptHome(LOsAltos) =0 
~Ptpolice(LOsAltos ) = 0.40 
~Ptcoworker(LOsAltos) = 0.43 
~Pt menlopark ( LosA  ltos ) = - 0.06 
~ptLosAttos(LOsAltos ) = O. 11 
~Sl~ome(LosAltos) = 0 
~Seotice(LosAltos) =0 
~Scoworker(LOsAltos ) = O. 12 
~SMenloPar k (LosA ltos ) = - 0.08 
~S LoIAItos ( L osA lt os ) = 0.02 
From this information, which is plotted in Figure 8, we can conclude that my 
knowing that Rufus was at home at 8:00 had no bearing on the conclusion that he 
is probably in Los Altos now, while the information provided by the police and 
my coworker were the strongest pieces of evidence supporting Los Altos. Only 
the fact that Rufus had gone to Menlo Park once before argues against him being 
in Los Altos now. This information can be used to construct explanations touser 
queries: 
Why do you believe Spt(LosA l tos)  = 0.63? 
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P~s(A) 
Ho.e  a t  8 :88  
Went to  Hen lo  Park 
once  be fore  • 
Ceworker  • 
Uent  to  Los  f l l to5  
once  be fore  
Po l i ce  repor t  A 
Spt(A)  
Figure 8. Plot of the Sensitivities of Spt(LosAltos) and Pls(LosAltos) from the Lost- 
Dog Story. 
Because 
the police reported that Rufus was seen in San Mateo County at 9:00, and 
my coworker eported seeing a dog that looks like Rufus along Highway 
280, and 
Rufus went to Los Altos once before. 
Another example uses negativity of P~ssi (LosAltos) to answer a question: 
Is there any reason to believe that Rufus is not in Los Altos? 
Yes. 
Rufus went to Menlo Park once before. 
If the user desires a more complete response than this, we can construct an 
explanation from those compatibility relations that were used along any 
particular path in the graph. A natural anguage text that describe what the 
compatibility relation encodes might suffice (e.g., DELTA-Cities is "the limits 
on how far a dog can travel in one hour"); otherwise, the identification of 
particular links in the relation (perhaps graphically) can help pinpoint a reason. 
This analysis indicates only the effect of each primitive piece of evidence 
individually; the joint effect of multiple bodies of evidence is not determined. 
Computing joint effects numerically, while conceptually straightforward, 
requires exploration of a combinatorially large parameter space. 
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Entire Body of Evidence 
Explanations of a single hypothesis (such as those derived in the preceding 
section) are quite similar to those produced in systems based on certainty factors 
or inference nets. The notion of a body of evidence that is used in evidential 
reasoning permits a higher-level description of an inference chain. Rather than 
asking a question about a belief in a particular proposition, the user can pose 
questions that search for the primitive pieces of evidence that were the most 
influential in general. 
There have been numerous proposals for characterizing BOEs (Dubois and 
Prade [16]) that can be used as the basis for selecting informative explanations. 
While nearly any sound characterization will suffice for our present purposes, 
we will make use of several due to Yager [17]. Further discussion of such 
measures for several classes of uncertainty distributions can be found in Klir and 
Folger [18]. 
We have already noted that the theory of belief functions allows representa- 
tion of varying degrees of precision as well as uncertainty. The relative precision 
of a BOE can be characterized by the following expression for specificity: 
mo(Aj) 
spec(mo)-" (4.2) 
Aj_ o IIaAI 
where [[Aj I] is the cardinality of the subset Aj. It is easy to show that 
1 
0 < ~-~_< Spec(mo)_< 1 for any mass distribution me 
Roughly speaking, Spec(mo) measures the degree of commitment of a belief 
function to precise propositions, assuming that each element of 0 is equally 
precise. The vacuous belief unction, me: mo(O) = 1, has the smallest possible 
specificity for any frame O. A mass distribution whose specificity is 1 is a 
classical probability distribution as well. 
The relative uncertainty of a BOE can be characterized by an entropy-like 
measure. Yager defines 
Ent(mo) - - ~ mo(Aj) In Pls(Aj) (4.3) 
AjC_O 
and shows that Ent(mo) is just Shannon's measure of entropy in the special case 
where me is a probability distribution. To use this measure to generate 
explanations, it will be more convenient to work instead with a measure of 
consonance: 
1 
Cons(too) "- (4.4) 
1 + Ent(mo) 
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so that 
0 < Cons(too)-< 1 
Minimal consonance is thus maximal entropy and exists whenever the focal 
elements of a mass distribution are mutually exclusive. Consonance equal to one 
occurs when all the focal elements are nested and thus represents a possibility 
distribution as defined by fuzzy set theory (Zadeh [5], Yager [17], Shafer [19]). 
To gain some intuition, it is useful to note that any BOE is characterized by a 
point in the unit square shown in Figure 9. The special cases of possibility 
distributions and probability distributions lie on boundaries of the square. A 
Boolean statement has Cons(m) = Spec(m) = 1. The vacuous belief function 
has Cons(m) = 1 and Spec(m) = 0 and is represented by the upper left corner 
of the square. Starting with no information and gradually fusing pieces of 
evidence as they become available, we trace a path in the square that starts at the 
upper left corner and wanders through the space. The ideal analysis would reach 
a Boolean conclusion (upper right corner), but typically the path stops 
somewhere short. The intuition, then, is that pieces of evidence that move the 
path closer to the upper right corner are the most important ones for making 
decisions. 
We are now in a position to select pieces of evidence as justification for an 
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Figure 10. Sensitivity Space for Characterizations of a Body of Evidence. 
analysis to choose the components of the explanation, but this time we will 
measure the change in our two characterizations of a BOE. We define 
~c/ (m)  - O Spec(m) O0~i ai  ~- 1 and o~nsi(m) O Cons(m) 
"-- ~/  ~i = 1 
(4.5) 
as the sensitivity of specificity and consonance, respectively, where oti is the 
credibility of BOEi as before. Once again, these measures can be computed for 
each item of primitive vidence and plotted in sensitivity space for comparison 
(see Figure 10). 
In this graph, the northeast quadrant represents hose BOEs whose inclusion 
in an analysis forces the path to the upper right (the Boolean case) and are 
therefore important for making decisions. The southwest quadrant contains 
BOEs whose inclusion decreases both the consonance and specificity--these are 
pieces of evidence that run counter to the consensus and may be suggestive of an 
errorful source or a need to use case-based reasoning by maintaining multiple 
analysis paths. The other quadrants can be interpreted as labeled. Once again, 
distance from the origin indicates the relative contribution of evidence to the 
conclusion. Appendix A contains examples illustrating evidence that falls in 
each of the four quadrants. 
Sensitivity analysis for the BOE that represents he conclusion from the lost- 
dog story reveals: 
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Ho~e at  8 :88  
A 
Cons(m) 
Uent  to  Los  Rl tos  
once  before  
Po l i ce  repor t  
Coworker  • 
Sp cCm) 
Merit to  Men lo  Park  
• once  be fore  
Figure 11. 
Story. 
Plot of the Sensitivity of Specificity and Consonance from the Lost-Dog 
~'~Home(m ) = 0.00 
p~eCeolice(m ) = 0.22 
p~eCCoworker(m ) = 0.25 
p~CeCMenloPark(m) =0.02 
p~ceCLo~lto, (m ) = 0.06 
COnSHome(m ) = 0.00 
O~nS eo,ice ( m ) =0.00 
O~HSCoworker (m) = -- 0.05 
O~ Menlopark ( m ) = -0 .13  
oC~ Lo, A l ,o~ (m ) = 0.01 
From these sensitivities (plotted in Figure 11) it is clear that the fact that Rufus 
was at home at 8:00 did not contribute to the conclusion. The sensitivities of 
specificity indicate that the conclusion would have been much less specific if 
either the coworker's report or the police report had been excluded from the 
analysis--these pieces of evidence were instrumental in establishing Los Altos as 
the strongest possibility. Looking at the consonance values, the fact that Rufus 
had gone to Menlo Park once before argues against he consensus most strongly, 
while the coworker's report disputes the argument for Menlo Park, which would 
have been the consensus of the other four reports. These results can be used to 
answer questions about the analysis: 
Which reports can bc ~fely ignored? 
Rufus was at home at 8:00. 
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Which reports argue against he consensus? 
Rufus went to Menlo park once before, and 
my coworker reported seeing adog that looks like Rufus along Highway 280. 
Using Sensitivity Results To Generate Explanations 
With these tools in hand, a number of different questions about an analysis can 
be answered. In the following, Q indicates aquestion that might be posed by the 
user, and e indicates aprocedure that can be used to construct an answer to that 
question. 
Q: Why do you strongly believe A? (I.e., Which report argues most 
strongly for A?) 
p: Choose the BOEi for which'~'tpt/(A) is greatest. 
Q: Why don't you believe B?. (I.e., Which report argues most strongly 
against B?.) 
p: Choose the BOEi for which ~ssi(B) is most negative. 
Q: Which reports erve to focus the conclusion more precisely? (I.e., Which 
bodies of evidence cause the conclusion to become more specific and 
more coherent?) 
P: Choose those BOEi for which ~c i  (m) and o~ns i (m) are both positive. 
Q: Which report most strongly disagrees with the consensus? (I.e., Which 
body of evidence serves to make the conclusion the most divergent?) 
p: Choose the BOEi for which I~o~si(m) is most negative. 
Q: Which reports can be safely ignored? (I.e., Which bodies of evidence are 
inconsequential?) 
p: Choose those BOEi for which f f~i (m)  ~ o~nsi(m) ~ O. 
Q: What are the most influential reports that impinge upon this conclusion? 
(I.e., Which bodies of evidence are farthest from the origin in sensitivity 
space?) 
p: Choose those BOEi for which [~ i (m) ]  2 + [~o~si(m)] 2 is greatest. 
Throughout this paper we have used the Rufus example to illustrate our use of 
sensitivity analysis for constructing explanations ofevidential analyses. A more 
thorough example of these explanation techniques, applied to a more compli- 
cated evidential domain, is detailed in Appendix B. 
5. DISCUSSION 
The three requirements of explanation generation from Section 2 have been 
satisfied by our approach: 
324 Thomas M. Strat and John D. Lowrance 
1. The difficulty of recapitulating program actions within systems that use a 
numeric measure of uncertainty has been overcome by the use of 
sensitivity analysis. By varying the input parameters and recomputing an 
analysis, the system can explain the interaction of the evidence and its 
impact upon selected conclusions. Focusing on the credibility of bodies of 
evidence instead of probabilities of individual propositions makes ensitiv- 
ity analysis of belief functions feasible. 
2. The correct level of detail can be controlled in two ways. First, the depth 
of exploration can be confined to a selected subtree within the analysis. 
When additional detail is requested, the subtree can be expanded to reveal 
previously hidden details. Second, the number of justifications to be 
provided is adjusted by rank-ordering the sensitivities and choosing the 
most important ones. 
3. A shared vocabulary is also provided in two forms. As with the other 
technologies, natural language text is associated with each primitive 
evidence node and displayed in place of the machine representation 
(Swartout [21]). Second, the vocabulary is in terms of the high-level 
constructs of a set of related beliefs represented by bodies of evidence, 
instead of each proposition and its belief individually. 
The use of evidential reasoning provides a richer vocabulary for expressing 
belief about uncertain events than is available in most other technologies but 
confounds the construction of suitable xplanations of chains of inference. The 
use of sensitivity analysis as described here not only permits the customary 
forms of explanation characteristic of rule-based systems, but also enables a 
variety of additional queries to be posed and answered. 
The tools presented in this paper have several uses in addition to that of 
constructing explanations for a user. Sensitivity information can be an important 
component of decision analysis. Knowledge of the sensitivity of conclusions can 
suggest whether sufficient information is available, or whether additional 
information should be sought. It can also be used to focus information-collection 
efforts. By hypothesizing the information that might be collected by a particular 
source, one can determine whether it could possibly have sufficient impact on 
the hypothesis to alter a pending decision. These ideas, while promising, have 
not yet been investigated. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented an approach to constructing an answer to various kinds of 
questions that can be asked about a conclusion derived though evidential 
reasoning. We have argued that he technique satisfies the three requirements for 
explanations. It also has the generality to be able to provide a variety of 
information about an evidential inference chain and can be used to further 
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insulate the user from the cryptic numbers that are manipulated by the machine. 
Coupling this mechanism with the evidential reasoning techniques already 
developed allows the creation of a powerful knowledge-based system for 
reasoning under uncertainty that can explain its behavior in understandable 
terms. 
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APPENDIX A. AN EXPLORATION OF SENSITIVITY SPACE 
In this appendix we give examples of evidence that fall in each of the four 
quadrants of sensitivity space (Figure 12). By studying each example, one can 
gain a better understanding of the meaning of sensitivities for more complicated 
analyses. 2 
The question under consideration is the make of car that Fred is going to buy. 
He has gone to a used car dealer who has only five cars available. The frame of 
discernment is the set containing the make of each car: 
{ Mercedes 280S1, Porsche 944, Ford Escort, Ford Mustang, Ford Taurus } 
In each case, we will fuse a mass distribution defined over this frame with the 
following mass distribution, which reflects our initial assessment of Fred's 
choice: 
j" 0.90 x= {Porsche 944} 
m0(x) = 
0.10 x= {Ford Escort, Ford Mustang, Ford Taurus} 
For m0, we have Spec(m0) = 0.933 and Cons(m0) = 0.755; that is, we 
strongly believe Fred will get the Porsche 944, we weakly believe that he might 
get one of the Fords, and we're sure that he won't get the Mercedes. 
2 This plot shows uperimposed the sensitivities of the four mass distributions relative to four 
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Figure 12. Sensitivity Space Plot for Automobile Example. 
Northeast Quadrant: Specific and Coherent 
We fuse m0 with m l, a mass distribution independently assessed by a 
neighbor, that just happens to be equivalent to m0. The fusion yields 
~" 0.99 x= {Porsche 944} 
tn01(x)  - L 0.01 x= {Ford Escort, Ford Mustang, Ford Taurus} 
Spec(m01) =0.992 and Cons(m01) =0.938 
We compute SpeCml(m01) = 0.059 and Consml(m01) = 0.183. It can be 
seen that inclusion of m 1 makes the conclusion more specific and more 
coherent, as expected. 
Southeast Quadrant: Specific and Divergent 
We will fuse m 0 with the following mass distribution assessed by a different 
neighbor, who strongly believes Fred will get the Mustang and weakly suggests 
that he will get one of the foreign cars. 
I0.90 x= {Ford Mustang} 
m2(x) = 0.10 x= {Porscbe 944, Mercedes 280SL} 
Mustang and Porsche are equally likely in the result: 
f 0.50 x = {Ford Mustang} 
mO2(x) = (0.50 x= {Porscbe 944} 
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Spec(m02) = 1.0 and Cons(m02) = 0.591 
We compute Specm2(m02) = 0.067 and Consm2(m02) = -0.164. It can be 
seen that inclusion of m 2 makes the conclusion more specific (since all the belief 
is now attributed to individual cars) but less coherent (because the belief is 
divided evenly among disjoint propositions) than the original beliefs, m0. 
Northwest Quadrant: Vague and Coherent 
We fuse m0 with the following mass distribution, which strongly supports 
Mercedes 280SL and weakly supports Ford: 
~'0.90 x= {Mercedes 280SL} 
rn3(x )  = 
0.10 x= {Ford Escort, Ford Mustang, Ford Taurus} 
Their fusion yields complete belief in Ford. (Although neither mass distribution 
held that Ford was very likely, it was the only proposition that both admitted as a 
possibility.) 
mO3(x) = 1.0, x= {Ford Escort, Ford Mustang, Ford Taurus} 
Spec(m03) -- 0.333 and Cons(m03) = 1.0 
This results in Specm3(m03) = - 0.600 and Consm3(m03) = 0.245. It can be 
seen that inclusion of m 3 makes the conclusion less specific (because mass has 
"moved" from a proposition containing only one element to a proposition that is 
a disjunction of three elements) but more coherent (because now all the mass is 
focused upon a single proposition). 
Southwest Quadrant: Vague and Divergent 
We fuse m0 with the following mass distribution, which indicates trong 
belief for Mercedes and weak belief equally divided between Mustang and the 
other Fords: 
I 
0.90 x= {Mercedes 280SL} 
m4(x) = 0.05 x = {Ford Mustang} 
0.05 x= {Ford Escort, Ford Taurus} 
Their fusion results in complete belief in Ford, with equal ikelihood in it being a 
Mustang or not: 
~0.50 x= {Ford Mustang} 
mO4(x) = (.0.50 x= {Ford Escort, Ford Taurus} 
Spec(m04) =0.750 and Cons(m04) = 0.591 
This yields Specm4(m04) = -0.183 and Consm4(m04) = -0.164. It can be 
seen that inclusion of m4 makes the conclusion less specific (because now only 
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half the belief is attributed to an individual car) and less coherent (because the 
belief is evenly divided between two disjoint propositions). 
APPENDIX B. DETECTIVE EXAMPLE 
In this appendix we provide an extensive collection of explanations 
constructed asanswers to various questions by using the techniques described in 
the body of the paper. The figures are taken directly from the screen images 
produced by the implementation f these techniques within Gister. As of this 
writing, emphasis has been placed on providing a versatile xplanation facility 
rather than one in which the operations have been prepackaged into their most 
user-friendly form. It is hoped that experience gained with the present 
implementation will lead to a better understanding of the important criteria for 
evidential explanations. For this reason, the actual facilities described should be 
viewed as a substrate upon which a user-friendly explanation system could be 
constructed. 
The following detective story is used throughout the appendix for the sake of 
illustrating the range of explanatory information available. It has been chosen on 
the basis of being small enough for the casual reader to understand yet with 
enough richness to illustrate the scope of the explanation techniques. Of course, 
the need for explanation facilities is much more acute when constructing large 
analyses. 
THE CASE OF THE SWEETSHOP BURGLARY. When Mike arrived to open the 
sweetshop on Thursday morning, he found the safe in the office open and the 
receipts from the previous day ($645) missing. The burglar apparently used a 
key to enter the shop and knew the combination of the safe. A witness who lives 
across the street saw what appeared to be a man entering the sweetshop at the 
approximate ime of the burglary. 
Upon further investigation, we find that: 
• The only people with keys and knowledge of the combination are the 
sweetshop employees--Ann, David, Frank, Judy, and Mike. 
• Ann is overextended onher credit cards. 
• Frank broke his leg and is still using crutches to get around. 
• Mike recently started ating Judy, who was David's former girlfriend. 
• Judy's mother says that Judy was home all night. 
• The police find that although the fingerprints on the safe are smudged, it
can be determined that they are from someone's left hand. However, they 
cannot be sure that the prints are from the burglar. David and Ann are the 
only left-handed employees. 
Who is the burglar? 
The remainder of this appendix illustrates the result of analyzing this case 
using the evidential reasoning technology embodied in Gister. For our current 
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purposes, we are not as concerned with accurate numerical assessment of 
uncertainties a we are with deriving sound inferences given those uncertainties 
and extracting meaningful explanations based upon those derivations. 
In this analysis we make use of three frames of discernment reflecting the 
structure of the evidence in the detective story. 
Osex= {MALE, FEMALE} 
OHANDED: {LEFT, RIGHT, AMBIDEXTROUS} 
OstlsPEcrs = {ANN, DAVID, FRANK, JUDY, MIKE, OTHER} 
OTHER is included in OSUSPECrS to allow for the possibility that the burglar 
was not one of the five sweetshop employees) 
Using Gister, the detective nters his assessment of each piece of available 
evidence (Figure 13). A summary of his thoughts is provided in the figure for 
each assessment. 
He then constructs an analysis graph (Figure 14). The menus on the left 
contain the evidential reasoning operations used by the detective in constructing 
the analysis graph. Elliptical nodes encode individual bodies of evidence. 
Circular nodes represent derived conclusions. Evidential intervals of some 
selected propositions from "Conclusion" are displayed in the lower portion of 
the screen. The numbers in brackets are [Support, Plausibility] for each 
suspect--the shaded areas reflect hese bounds on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0. 
In constructing this analysis, the detective first combined Judy's alibi and 
Frank's injury to form an intermediate conclusion based on alibis. Next he 
discounted the financial motive by 60% (to account for the fact that the amount 
of money in the safe was likely too small to motivate the burglar) and combined 
it with the evidence representing the revenge motive to form the intermediate 
conclusion based on motives. Next he assembled the physical evidence by 
translating the witness report from the SEX frame of discernment to the 
SUSPECTS frame, translating the fingerprint evidence from the HANDED- 
NESS frame to the SUSPECTS frame, and combining them with the evidence 
regarding the burglary as an inside job. Finally, a conclusion was drawn by 
combining this physical evidence with the intermediate conclusions involving 
motives and alibis. Of course, the evidence could have been assembled in any 
order because the fusion operation is commutative and associative, but this 
choice does allow some meaningful intermediate conclusions. 
From this information, the detective concludes that David is the most likely 
suspect. But which pieces of evidence fingered him, and how sensitive is this 
conclusion to the assessments made by the detective? 
The sensitivity tools allow the detective to divide the pieces of evidence into 
useful categories (Figure 15). Each set is constructed by computing the 
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Cons(m) 
Judy's a l ib i  
Used le f t  hand 
: tank 's  a l ib i  
• • Revenge Motive 
• ~ Spec(m) Uitness A 
F inanc ia l  aot ive  Ins ide  job  
Figure 16. Scatter Plot in Sensitivity Space. 
sensitivity of the conclusion for each piece of evidence; those with sensitivities 
that exceed a threshold are selected. 
f f '~i  and oC~nsi of the conclusion are computed for each piece of evidence and 
plotted in Figure 16. Those reports near the origin (Frank's injury, Judy's alibi) 
are inconsequential. Those in the NE quadrant tend to agree with the consensus 
and also to narrow the set of suspects. Financial motive lends support to suspects 
other than David and is therefore dissonant. Inside job also is dissonant, because 
it rules out a possibility ("other") that all the other pieces of evidence admit. See 
Figure 10 for further explanation of each quadrant. 
The scatter plots of Figure 17 show the sensitivity of the evidential interval for 
each suspect. 
The graphs in Figure 18 portray how the specificity and consonance of the 
conclusion vary as the credibility of each piece of evidence is varied. The origin 
indicates the measure when the report is completely disregarded; the hash mark 
near the right end of the abscissa corresponds tothe initial assessment made by 
the detective. Intermediate values reflect various discounting factors. If the slope 
of the curve is positive, the evidence increases the specificity/consonance of the 
conclusion. The greater the slope, the more significant is the evidence. 
The graphs in Figure 19 show the effect hat credibility of a report has on the 
evidential intervals. The upper boundary of the shaded region shows how the 
plausibility changes as the credibility of a report is increased. The lower 
boundary shows the support. 
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P ls (A)  
Frank 's  in ju r}  
J udy 's  a l Jb~ 
F inane ia |  Mot ive  • 
I ns ide  job  
U i tness  • 
Revenge aot lve  
Used le f t  hand 
IIm... m..r 
Spt (A)  
Figure 17. Sensitivity of Support and Plausibility. (a) David: Inside job, Used left 
hand, Revenge motive, and Witness all tend to incriminate David. Only the financial 
motive (of Ann) argues against David's guilt. 
P~s(A) 
J udy 's  a l ib i  
F rank 's  in ju ry  
Revenge not~ve 
• M~tnass  
Ins ide  job  
F inanc ia l  nat ive  
• Used le f t  hand • 
Spt (A)  
Figure 17. (b) Ann is incriminated by her possible financial motive and by the inside 
job evidence. The witness report and David's revenge motive tend to absolve her. 
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^ 
Pls(A) 
J udy 's  a l ib i  
Frank 's  i n ju ry  
Revenge nut ive  • 
• Used le f t  hand 
I ns ide  j ob  
• Uitness 
• ^ 
Fi . . . .  ial .o t i~e  Spt(A) 
Figure 17. (c) Mike was right-handed, so the fingerprints (i.e., the "Used left hand" 
evidence) argues against his guilt. The financial motive adds some support to Mike but 
also decreases his plausibility slightly. Since Mike had more of a financial motive than 
David, Frank, or Judy, but less than Ann, it both supports and refutes Mike's guilt. 
P~s(A) 
Inside job  
F rank 's  injury 
F~ . . . .  ie l  . o t i~  Spt(A) 
J udy 's  a l ib i  
Revenge eot ive  
IJi tness  
Used le f t  hand 
Figure 17. (d) Judy: Nothing in the collection of evidence points directly to Judy, so 
Spt(Judy) = 0.0, even if one piece of evidence were removed. In fact, only it's being an 
Inside job is suggestive of Judy. 
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A 
PIs(A) 
I ns ide  job 






Frank 's  injury 
Used left hand 
(e) Frank: Same reasoning as for Judy. 
I ns ide  job  • 
J i tness  
Used l e f t  hand 
Revenge Mot ive  , 
Financial not lve  
Frank"  s i n ju ry  Spt (A)  
J udy 's  alibi 
Figure 17. (f) Other: Inside job completely rules out the possibility of "other." 
Therefore, it decreases both the support and plausibility of "other." The remaining 
reports provide no information either for or against any nonemployees. 





rr -rrrrT---  
Figure 18. Sensitivity of specificity and consonance tothe credibility of each report. (a) 
The witness's report makes the conclusion more specific by increasing belief in male 
suspects. 
Consonance 
Jsed l e f t  hand Jsed l e f t  hand 
Figure 18. Co) The fingerprints increase both specificity and consonance by focusing on 
Ann and David. 
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Consonance 
Fi :ure 18. (c) Believing that it may have been an inside job decreases consonance 
initially because the conclusion is totally consonant without hat information (focused on 
"other").  But when its credibility nears certainty, the consonance increases as the 





Figure 18. (d) Financial motive is inherently dissonant because it points the finger (to 
varying degrees) at each employee. Thus, the more we believe it, the more dissonant is 
our conclusion. 
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~ pecif ic l ty 
~ e  
Consonance 
Revenge motive 
Figure 18. (e) Revenge motive slightly increases specificity by focusing even more on 
David. 
Specificity 
dud's  al ib i  
Consonance 
Figure 18. (f) Judy's alibi has no noticeable ffect, since her guUtis not suggested by 
the other evidence. 
Specificity 
Frank's al ib i  
Consonance 
:rank's a l ib i  
Figure lg. (g) Frank's injury has little effect, since the other evidence points only 
weakly to his possible guilt. 
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5pt, PIs] of Rnn 
( Cot 
[Spt, Pls] of Mike 
Cor 
= - ~ ~  of Judy 
(Concluslon) 
~ ~  of Frenk 
red b ty 0 tness 
Concluslon) 
j ~ of Other 
redt t t ry  o tness 
(Concl. uslon} 
Figure 19. Sensitivity of each evidential interval to the credibility of each report. (a) 
The witness's report raises the evidential interval for the male employees, David, Mike, 
and Frank, while lowering it for the two female employees. Since "other" is completely 
eliminated by the Inside job evidence, the witness's report (like all other bodies of 
evidence) has no impact on "other." 
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[Spt, Pla] of Rnn 
( Cot 
[Spt, PIs] of Mike 
(Cot 
[Spt, Pls]  of Judy 
Cot 
[Spt, P1s] of Frank - -  ~ of Other J 
red b ty o se • t a 
(Conc lus lon)  (Concluslon) 
Figure 19, (b) The fingerprints incriminate the left-handed employees, David and Ann, 
while supporting the innocence of the others. 
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Cc 
[Spt, P ls ]  of Rnn 
(Co, 
[Spt,  P l s ]  of Mike 
~.Con( 
~ of Judy 
(Conclusi on) 
~ o f  Frank 
re ty  o n$ de 0 
(Conc lus ion)  
Figure 19. (c) Inside job contributes to the guilt of all the employees. The plausibility of 
"other," which was 1.0 without this information, is completely eliminated as a 
possibility with its inclusion. 
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re 1 ty  o nanc a no v 
OoncIus~on) 
[Spt, Pls]  of M~ke 
Co~ 
[Spt, PI=] of  Rnn 
( Cor 
- ~ ~ o f  Judy 
(Conclusion) 
~ of Frank 
~red]b~l~t~ Of F~nenc-h~l~t--~ 
[Concluslon) 
~ o f  Other 
re  b~ t~ o nanc a no 
(Concluelon) 
Figure 19. (d) The financial motives tend to absolve David while incriminating Ann. It 
has little effect on the other employees, since they are not suspected by the other 
evidence. 
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Cc 
I 
Spt, PIs] of  Bnn 
(Cor 
[$pt, PIs] of Mike 
i Col 
of Judy 
(Conc ] usi o _ ~ )  
F - -  ~ of Frank 
! , 
red  b ty  o evenge not  
(Concluslon) 
- -  ~ o f  Other 
re  b ty  o evenge not i  
(Conclusion) 
Figure 19. (e) Revenge motive points toward David and away from all others. 
350 Thomas M. Strat and John D. Lowrance 
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A [SDt, PIs] OF Rnn 
re  ty o Ju y s a b 
[Conc Iu~ion)  
[Sptj PIs] of Mike 
[Col (Conc lus ion)  
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Figure 19. (f) Judy's alibi has no effect on anyone but Judy. 
Explaining Evidential Analyses 351 
l 
, LSpt, PlsJ [ t, I•] of David 
Credlbl l l ty  of Frank's alibi 
(Conclusion) 
[Sptj PI$] of Rnn 
(Cor 





[Spt, P15] of" Frank ~ ~ of Other 
re ty o ran • a 
'~ Oonclusl on) (Concluslon) 
Figure 19. (g) Frank's injury decreases the plausibility of Frank, while remaining 
noncommittal toward everyone lse. 
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